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FORUM 
BATTLE 2000: THE NEW JET ENTRANTS VERSUS THE REGIONAL PARTNERS? 
Alan R. Bender 
Editor's Note: Articles printed in the Fomm section are non-refereed and express solely the opinion of their 
authors. 
An airline economics war that will determine the future pattern of air service in many U.S. short- and 
intermediate-haul markets is under way. The megacarriers are eliminating mainline jet service on these routes 
due to their high costs, inappropriate operational patterns, and restrictive labor agreements. To the dismay 
of many passengers, regional partner carriers are filling the voids by raising fares and replacing jets with 
"undesirable" turboprop aircraft. This paper investigates the problem's underlying causes and describes the 
looming battle between new entrant jet carriers and regional partner airlines for dominance in these 
important medium-size markets. 
BACKGROUND 
Deregulation's promise of efficient, low-fare commercial 
airline service has been, to date, only partially fulfilled, 
especially in U.S. second-tier markets. The proliferation 
of new entrant jet airlines in the early 1980s was followed 
by nearly as many bankruptcies. In addition, the well- 
known trunk, local service, and intrastate jet airlines that 
had survived the early deregulation years were themselves 
the aggressors, or victims, in a massive consolidation of 
carriers that erased the names of some of the most well- 
known jet airlines in North America (Western, Republic, 
Ozark, PSA, and Air Cal, among others). 
By 1990, only a small number of deregulation- 
spawned jet carriers had survived (Jordan, 1995). More 
importantly, most U.S. cities were left without any 
unrestricted low-fare jet service, save the score or so 
cities in the southwestern United States served by 
Southwest Airlines. In fact, the situation in 1990 was so 
dire that the California State Senate seriously debated 
whether to sponsor a state-owned jet airline to return 
California intrastate ticket prices to reasonable levels 
("California Senate Unit," 1990). This predicament was 
particularly ironic because successful and time-tested low- 
fare California intrastate jet service was a crucial 
argument in the mid-1970s deregulation debate and the 
inspiration for the founding of Texas-based low-cost 
leader Southwest Airlines. 
Although the California crisis was primarily 
precipitated by the acquisition of historically low-cost 
PSA by high-cost USAir, the problem was mitigated in a 
relatively short time by the major deployment of 
Southwest Airlines' equipment and other resources into 
the California intrastate market. 
However, most other U.S. states and regions have 
not, until quite recently, been so fortunate; their low-fare 
services have waxed and waned along with the fortunes 
and, more typically, misfortunes of the new entrant jet 
operators. The abundant though now defunct startup 
carriers of the 1980s have been supplanted in the 1990s 
by a new generation of low-cost, low-fare airlines 
(Jordan, 1995). Many cities that lost unrestricted low-fare 
jet senice in the late 1980s are again receiving flights 
from low-cost airlines. In fact, the competition in many 
markets has become fierce. In late 1994 American 
Airlines reported that it was competing with low-fare jet 
carriers in 40% of its domestic markets, up from 25% in 
early 1994 and only 8% in early 1993 (O'Brien, 1994). 
According to a 1994 study by the aviation consulting firm 
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Simat, Helliesen, & Eichner Inc. (SH&E), low-fare 
airlines were generating about 24% of the 200-400 mile 
market available seat-miles (ASMs) in 1994, 
approximately double their 1992 share (Moorman, 1994). 
For the nine-year period between 1985 and 1994, low- 
cost carriers increased their share of total (all markets) 
U.S. domestic traffic from 3% to 13.5% (Banks, 1994). 
The overall trend is unmistakable, portending, perhaps, 
a watershed in the deregulated air transportation 
industry. 
Others have studied the counter-cyclical nature of 
startup airline activity (Harraf & Vasigh, 1994). This 
theory states that when economic conditions are poor, 
the public may be unwilling or unable to purchase full- 
fare airline transportation. The theory also claims that jet 
transport aircraft are easily obtained and relatively cheap 
to purchase or lease during economic downturns. Finally, 
the theory purports that since many commercial pilots 
are out of work during recessions, they may be willing to 
work for relatively low wages at unproven companies 
during such times. Conversely, the theory states that 
when economic conditions improve, the public will be 
more likely to purchase full-fare airline transportation; in 
addition, during such growth periods the supply of 
aircraft and pilots dries up. The result is the gradual 
demise of startup airlines during economic growth 
periods. 
Although this hypothesis adequately explains the 
surfeit of planes, pilots, and startup jet airlines during 
both the early 1980s and the early 1990s (plus, the 
dramatic contraction in new entrant services in the late 
1980s), it cannot account for the pro-cyclical pattern of 
the mid-1990s. Between 1993 and 1995 significant 
economic expansion was accompanied by tremendous 
growth in low-cost service by new entrant jet airlines 
(Jordan, 1995). Although only anecdotal evidence exists 
to explain this trend, there is a virtual mountain of non- 
scientific literature, virtually all pointing toward a secular 
change in air transportation's basic demand 
characteristics (Aviation Systems Research Corp. 
[ASRC], 1993; Banks, 1994; Bender, 1993; Phillips, 1994). 
The upshot is clear: In the budget conscious 1990s, 
neither leisure nor business passengers may be willing to 
pay any more than what they consider a very fair price 
for an airline ticket, any airline ticket. With respect to 
travel for company business, the literature is replete with 
case studies of the thousands of U.S. companies that have 
cut middle management positions, begun close 
monitoring of company travel, entered into negotiations 
with airlines for the lowest possible fares, and purchased 
videoconferencing systems, all of which can severely cut 
air camer revenues (Apogee Research Inc., 1994; Bryant, 
1994; Raphael & Starry, 1995). It is worth noting that 
business travelers have traditionally accounted for 34% 
of the people flying on U.S.-registered airlines but an 
estimated 70% of passenger revenues (Stephenson & 
Fox, 1992). In the 1990s these percentages have 
apparently changed, and every major U.S. airline has 
gotten the message: reduce operating costs and therefore 
average fares or cease to exist. 
It is interesting to note that few if any "experts" 
predicted the current situation as recently as five or six 
years ago. Warren Buffett's monumental 1989 investment 
in USAir is evidence of the prevailing and absolutely 
inaccurate wisdom at that time. One can only conjecture 
that had U.S. corporations not been forced to 
dramatically trim their expenses and operate their 
companies much more efficiently from approximately 
1990 forward, then American, Delta, United, and others 
might have irrefutably won the deregulation battle with 
their well-documented late 1980s practices: mega- 
mergers, hub airport creation and monopolization, 
corporate ubiquity (servicing all 50 states), code-sharing, 
frequent-flier bonuses, commission overrides, and 
sophisticated computer reservations and yield 
management software. However, in the mid-1990s 
environment some of these practices have apparently 
been neutralized or otherwise successfully challenged by 
new competition, particularly in short-haul markets. 
THE STATUS OF THE SOUTHWEST CHALLENGE 
The outstanding financial performance of low-cost, low- 
fare leader Southwest Airlines during the recent 
economic downturn, when the U.S. airline industry as a 
whole lost nearly $13 billion, is convincing evidence that 
a major jet airline can attract new passengers and operate 
profitably even in a shrinking economy. Equally 
noteworthy is that Southwest has been financially 
successful while paying its employees salaries competitive 
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with those of its larger brethren while also operating one 
of the newest fleets of jet airplanes in the airline 
business. 
As has been reported in nearly every business 
publication in the United States, Southwest Airlines has 
consistently maintained peerless management-labor and 
company-customer relations. The Southwest model or 
variations of it are being cloned by new airline companies 
from coast to coast: from Shuttle by United and Western 
Pacific in the far West; to Vanguard in the Midwest; to 
Air South and Valujet in the Southeast; to Eastwind in 
the Northeast. In fact, these few names represent only a 
fraction of the Southwest-inspired carriers currently 
operating or in the Department of Transportation (DOT 
application process. Clearly, the stimulus for this 1990s 
genesis of low-cost, low-fare air carriers is Southwest 
Airlines' outstanding performance against a backdrop of 
failed or precariously viable megacamers. 
Comparisons of operating costs among U.S. large jet 
airlines demonstrate that not only is Southwest the 
nation's lowest-cost major carrier (1994: 7 cents/ASM), 
but on short hauls (which comprise more than 90% of 
Southwest's routes), its competitors' operating costs 
(1994: about 10 cents/ASM) are more than 40% higher 
than its own ("Trends," 1995). Since the megacamer 
competition operates identical or near-identical 
equipment and, as it is generally acknowledged that short 
(under two-hour) jet flights are perceived by many 
passengers as commodity services, Southwest Airlines is 
selling soybeans at the same price as everyone else 
(Southwest's 1994 revenue per ASM was only 9% lower 
than the industry average) while paying approximately 
40% less to grow them. 
In the 1970s and 1980s this disparity was not 
identified as catastrophic for the "grandfather" airlines, 
perhaps because business people often acquiesced to 
paying whatever it cost to fly on a major airline from 
point A to point B and, in any case, Southwest Airlines 
was a limited niche player at the time. Overambitious 
expansion and/or shoddy service killed most of the other 
low-cost, low-fare, early deregulation-era carriers, 
including sizable People Express. Still, the 1990s business 
and leisure travel climate is apparently so different from 
that of the 1980s that the megacarrier airlines need to 
significantly lower their costs for short-haul operations 
irrespective of direct competition from Southwest 
Airlines or any other low- cost, low-fare jet camer 
(Phillips, 1995). There is strong evidence today that for 
shorter trips many business people drive or do whatever 
else is necessary, including eliminating specific trips 
altogether, if they perceive air fares to be unjustifiably 
high (Rothman & Baker, 1993). Only in the 1990s have 
companies begun to seriously scrutinize business travel 
costs, which are typically a company's third-largest 
controllable expense after salaries and data processing 
(Bryant, 1994). 
Although airline transportation is often characterized 
as a long-haul business (the average passenger trip length 
was 983 miles, each way, in 1994), a significant and 
recently growing proportion of airline travel is short-haul: 
In 1993, 14 of the 23 busiest origin and destination 
(O&D) markets in the contiguous 48 states were less 
than 500 miles each way (U.S. Department of 
Transportation [DOT]/Air Transport Association [ATA], 
as cited in Aviation Week Group, 1995). More recent 
figures (12-month period ending June 30,1995) indicate 
that fully 48% of U.S. domestic O&D travel occurred in 
markets of 750 miles or less, each way (DOTIATA, 
1995). This is clearly due to Southwest's growth and the 
recent flurry of startup activity. The numbers portend 
further bad news for the high-cost majors. 
By their own admission, the megacarriers are 
economically uncompetitive with startups in the provision 
of short-haul services. Yet their continued domination of 
medium- and long-haul traffic cannot be assumed either, 
even though high megacamer operating costs are 
considerably mitigated by- long-haul flying. Southwest 
Airlines' Chairman and CEO Herb Kelleher recently 
estimated his company's ASM costs on routes of 900 
miles at 4.6 cents, and 4.0 cents for 1,400-mile trips such 
as Phoenix-Nashville (Velocci, 1995). If accurate, these 
numbers spell additional headaches for the megacamer 
competition because their long-term cost goals 
(approximately 7 cents per ASM for flights in the 900- 
mile category) pale in comparison with Southwest's 
current (and very recently dropping) operating costs. 
Nonetheless, it is debatable whether Southwest 
Airlines would be wise to introduce a significant medium- 
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or long-haul schedule. That is because many airline 
passengers find real value in extras such as assigned 
seating, increased legroom, onboard meals, and first- or 
business-class options when the greater part of a day 
must be spent on an airplane. Currently, Southwest 
Airlines does not offer any of these extras. (On its short, 
one-hour flights these frills are rarely missed, even by 
business travelers.) In addition, Southwest's policy of 
offering the most daily flights of any airline in nearly 
every city-pair market it serves might be impossible to 
maintain in long-haul markets. For example, while a fleet 
of only two jets can provide continuous turnaround 
service (every 90 minutes) between two cities located one 
hour's flying time apart, it would take four jets to provide 
the same 90-minute headways between two cities located 
three hours distant. 
According to Kelleher, Southwest has little intention 
of becoming a serious medium- or long-haul player 
(Velocci, 1995). Anyway, doing so would be a violation 
of yet another of Southwest's basic principles: to compete 
with the personal automobile, not other airlines. As there 
are relatively few people in the 1990s driving great 
distances for pleasure or especially business, there are 
few potential auto passengers to attract to a long-haul 
Southwest Airlines. Therefore, Southwest would have to 
steal traffic from other airlines or expand the market 
through low fares. Although Southwest could probably be 
successful at both, the fact that it would have very few 
auto passengers to capture would hurt its overall traffic 
potential in those markets as compared with its traffic 
potential in its traditional short-haul markets. In any 
case, Kelleher seems content to cherry-pick specific 
medium-haul routes that appear underserved by the other 
major airlines, such as Phoenix-Little Rock and Las 
Vegas-San Antonio. However, the very threat of a much 
longer-haul Southwest cannot be dismissed entirely, if 
only because of the Dallas-based carrier's phenomenally 
low costs and its reputation for near flawless reliability. 
No other major camer can make those claims. Therefore, 
the megacarrier airlines apparently have few sacred 
routes, at least on the domestic front. 
PRELUDE TO BATTLE 2000 
Given the current airline economic environment and the 
megacarriers' natural will to survive and prosper, the 
stage is conceivably set for an unraveling of some or even 
much of the U.S. airline network. For the near term, the 
principal battleground probably will not be in long-haul 
markets since, as demonstrated above, low-cost airlines 
would have considerable difficulty amassing the planes, 
perquisites, and passengers necessary for competitive 
success against the big carriers. On shorter routes, 
however, even a small jet airline with just a few planes 
can represent real competition for a major airline in 
terms of both pricing and flight frequency. mically, 
thousands of prospective passengers await the 
opportunity to be extricated from their automobiles and 
seated on airplanes if the price is right and the city-pair 
is of sufficient geographical separation and population 
size. Southwest Airlines' traditional market decisions and 
those of literally every one of its successful clones fit this 
model to a considerable degree. 
How can the megacarrier airlines with their much 
higher short-haul unit costs successfully compete? Here, 
too, the literature of the 1980s and early 1990s is replete 
with discussions of the strategic advantages high-cost 
large airlines have over low-cost small airlines, such as 
fortress hubs, generous frequent-flier bonuses, massive 
computer reservations systems, sophisticated yield 
management software, and travel agent kickbacks 
(Borenstein, I=, Levine, 1987; Sorenson, 1991). 
Because both new entrant and megacarrier short-haul 
flights must begin or end at or near a medium- or large- 
hub city for obvious economic reasons, the megacarrier 
can cross-subsidize whatever losses it incurs in the local 
O&D fight with the startup through its beyond traffic, 
that is, passengers connecting at the hub to the 
megacarrier's national and international networks. 
However, the effectiveness of these strategies appears to 
be of diminishing value in the austere 1990s due to 
significant cutbacks in corporate travel spending plus an 
explosion of low-cost new entrants and unprecedented 
growth at Southwest Airlines. So trapped, the 
megacarriers have no choice but to take drastic new 
measures, to be examined shortly. 
THE ASCENDANCE OF THE REGIONALS 
Thus far, there has been little discussion of the regional 
(formerly commuter) airline industry in the United 
States. This rapidly growing component of the national 
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transportation system has been expanding at well over 
twice the rate of the U.S. airline industry as a whole over 
the last decade, and today accounts for almost 12% of 
domestic enplanements (ATA, 1995; Regional Airline 
Association [RAA], 1995). It is not difficult to see why. 
Since 1988, the major airlines have transferred more than 
65% of their routes under 500 miles to the regionals 
(Schmit & Ritter, 1995). Operating, for the most part, 
19-, 30-, and 50-passenger turboprop aircraft, these low- 
wage, high-fare carriers are able to feed passengers to big 
airlines at mega-hub airports for a far lower cost per 
plane-mile than the majors can themselves. (More than 
90% of regional carrier passengers connect to a major 
airline for some part of their journey IRAA, 19951.) 
Through the use of airline code-sharing agreements with 
major carriers, the regionals appear to offer seamless 
connections between small-town America and 
metropolitan America. Code-sharing agreements and 
their impact have been thoroughly examined in the 
literature (Oster & Pickrell, 1988). 
Of course, the total cost of operating a 30-passenger 
turboprop aircraft between two cities, say, 250 miles 
apart, is about 50% less than operating a 120-passenger 
jet between those two places. (This illustration assumes 
typical 1995 operating costs: 18 cents/ASM for a 30- 
passenger turboprop operated by a regional airline; 10 
cents/ASM for a 120-passenger jet operated by a very 
efficient megacarrier airline.) Although the per seat cost 
for the turboprop is more than twice that of the jet, the 
fact that there are so few seats on the turboprop as 
compared to the jet means that relatively little 
discounting of the turboprop seats is necessary. 
Furthermore, when a turboprop aircraft is used to 
substitute for a jet, its much smaller capacity and higher 
per seat costs also mean that many local O&D passengers 
need to be shut out from the short-haul flight by high 
local fares (or little local seat availability) so that 
connecting long-haul passengers paying much higher total 
fares can be accommodated. 
It is not unusual to find city-pairs where, over the 
last few years, five round-trip megacarrier jet flights have 
been replaced by seven or eight round-trip regional 
carrier turboprop flights (or some combination thereof, 
such as five jets replaced by three jets and five 
turboprops). American Airlines has instituted this type of 
operation in some medium-size markets in the Texas area 
(Ojkial Airline Guide, 1989, 1992, 1995). Where this 
happens, flight frequency is often doubled while total 
capacity is typically halved. The greater flight frequency 
is potentially attractive to business people, for whom 
departure time convenience is important. Such is not the 
case for leisure and other discretionary travelers, 
however, because they cannot normally afford the high 
prices that must be charged for most turboprop seats. 
This shutting out of local and discretionary travel is an 
economically justified practice because of the high per 
seat operating cost of turboprop aircraft, but one has to 
wonder about its efficacy. Indeed, as Southwest Airlines 
is able to continue providing very profitable, low-priced 
jet service in the relatively large Texas markets (Lubbock- 
Dallas and MidlandjOdessa-Dallas, for example) from 
which American Airlines pulled its jets, it is logical to 
infer that something is curiously wrong in the airline 
transportation business, something beyond the realm of 
straight economics. 
Two points require clarification, however, before the 
looming conflict can be fully explored. First, the 
overwhelming majority of regional carrier routes are not 
suited to jets: neither 1990s-era 50-passenger regional jets 
nor 1970s-era 120-passenger Boeing-type jets. These 
regional markets, as noted earlier, are predominantly 
short-haul routes connecting small-town America with 
large hub airports/cities. The automobile represents 
extremely intense competition in these markets because 
the distances involved are so short and/or the spoke cities 
so small that only a high frequency schedule of flights has 
any chance of pulling potential regional airline 
passengers from their cars. Note, too, that the equipment 
must be relatively small not only because the spoke cities 
are second- and third-tier places, but also because a 
massive schedule of departures is necessary in order to be 
competitive with the automobile. (One can easily drive 
most regional-type routes in three or four hours; in 
comparison, the airplane option involves about 55 
minutes of flying time, plus driving time to the airport, 
for a total journey time of approximately two hours.) 
Using large airplanes for such high-frequency service 
would generate far more seats than the market could 
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absorb. The cost per seat for this very frequent, small 
aircraft service is, again, very high, around 18 cents per 
mile; average fares are, of course, even higher, 
approximately 40-45 cents per mile (Brooks, 1992). 
Clearly, anyone in such a hurry to travel a very short 
distance to save so little time is someone for whom time 
is quite valuable, typically a business person. Fortunately, 
since more than 90% of U.S. regional carrier passengers 
connect at hub cities to major carrier jet flights, the high 
prices of their regional airline legs are prorated over the 
total cost of their tickets; this mitigates somewhat the 
pain of the short but expensive regional flights. Still, for 
most of the deregulated era the majority of passengers 
using the regionals have been business people, whereas 
the majority of passengers flying the majors have been 
traveling for leisure or discretionary purposes. 
The potential conflict arises because regional airlines' 
average trip length has increased significantly over the 
last 10 years: from 160 miles in 1984 to 210 miles in 1994 
(RAA, 1995). This means, logically, that one-half of all 
regional flights are longer than 210 miles. In comparison, 
Southwest Airlines' average segment was about 375 miles 
in 1994 (Velocci, 1995). This means that half of 
Southwest's flights are less than 375 miles each way. The 
potential conflict is manifest not simply because the 
regionals are now flying some Boeing-type distances, but, 
more importantly, because they are flying these longer 
routes between their hub airports and more and more 
medium-size (not small) cities (Fresno-Los Angeles, Des 
Moines-Chicago, Portland (ME)-New York City, 
Syracuse-Cleveland, Wichita-Dallas, and so on). The 
major-to-regional hand-me-down route practices of the 
last 10 years may be reaching an untenable state of 
affairs. 
The second and related point: Much has been written 
recently on why the megacamer airlines are so inefficient 
in providing short-haul jet service while Southwest 
Airlines and its clones are able to do the job cheaply and 
efficiently (Kling, 1993; Kling & Smith, 1994). Indeed, 
the major airlines have been termed dinosaurs and 
dysfunctionals by renowned analysts nationwide (ASRC, 
1993; Banks, 1994). The reasons are numerous, but the 
relevant arguments include the over-reliance on hub-and- 
spoke route systems (and their many implications, to be 
discussed shortly), possession of far too many different 
types of jet aircraft, offering a higher quality of s e ~ c e  
(Macy's) on short trips than the public desires (Wal- 
Mart), and archaic work rules. The problem is most acute 
for short trips because it is difficult to tack all of the 
megacamer inefficiencies onto the price of a presumably 
cheaper ticket. The megacamers engage in this latter 
practice, anyway, but are foiled whenever a low-cost 
airline enters the market. 
Again, the recent flood of low-cost jet airlines into 
the marketplace is apparently such a threat to the majors 
that they appear to be handing over routes to their 
regional partners almost willy-nilly. As noted earlier, 
when a regional inherits a route it tends to focus on 
connecting traffic because it cannot compete for large 
numbers of local O&D passengers due to its very high 
per seat costs. However, the regional has so few seats to 
sell that it does not have to compete for very many of the 
local passengers, anyway. The problem is that the 
regional carriers operate aircraft models (medium-size 
turboprops in the types of markets under scrutiny) that 
are demonstrably inferior to the kinds of aircraft (pure 
jets) operated by even the lowliest of low-cost startup 
airlines: inferior in comfort, inferior in speed, and 
inferior in per seat economics (Regeski, 1995). 
BATIZE 2000 
The megacamers' hub-and-spoke systems are expensive 
to operate but provide the flying public with frequent, 
convenient connecting service between literally every pair 
of metropolitan places in the United States as well as 
between many smaller city-pairs. As described extensively 
elsewhere, the major problem with this mode of 
operation is that aircraft must sit idle at hub airports for 
50-60 minutes each time they land in order to provide 
boarding passengers coming from scores of other planes 
with convenient, guaranteed connections (ASRC, 1993). 
Obviously, planes and flight crews are totally 
unproductive sitting at airport gates. The cost is quite 
significant, therefore, whenever a jet has to transit a 
connecting hub city more than once a day. For a 
predominantly short-haul hubbing airline like USAir, the 
costs can be immense. Additionally, the expense of 
leasing dozens of airport gates that are used only once 
every hour or two is not insignificant either. Combine 
Page 12 JAAER, Fall 1995 
6
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1995], Art. 2
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol6/iss1/2
Battle 2000 
this with the alternating peaking and ebbing of ticket 
counter, gate agent, and other requirements, and a very 
expensive system has been created. 
The opinion of many industry analysts is that 
passengers, especially business passengers, were willing or 
able in the 1980s to subsidize this convenient though 
expensive system by paying relatively high fares. In the 
1990s, this may no longer be the case. Moreover, it is 
evident that the airline industry engaged in excessive hub 
building in the 1980s, exacerbating the problem. (Many 
of these secondary hubs have since been closed or handed 
down to regional partner airlines.) 
The continuous hubbing approach Southwest 
Airlines takes is altogether different. By providing 
frequent flights in literally every market it serves, 
Southwest offers reasonably good connections as a 
byproduct. Flights are not scheduled to depart or arrive 
at the same time. If they do, fine. If not, connecting 
passengers may have to wait one hour, perhaps two, to 
catch their ongoing flights. Southwest's primary goal is to 
keep ground time to a bare minimum: 20-25 minutes 
maximum. 
Therefore, purposely coordinating flights is actually 
undesirable. A passenger who traveled on Southwest 
Airlines from, say, Sacramento to San Antonio in mid- 
1995 would likely have had to transit Phoenix (Official 
Airline Guide, 1995). Assuming a Sacramento departure 
on the early morning Phoenix nonstop, the San Antonio- 
bound passenger would have had to wait two hours in 
Phoenix for the best nonstop connection to San Antonio. 
If, however, that Sacramento originating passenger's 
destination were Kansas City, the connecting time in 
Phoenix would have been only one hour. In comparison, 
the banked hub-and-spoke systems of the megacarrier 
airlines literally guarantee 45-60 minute connections 
between any two cities; however, this very convenient 
type of service comes at a price that, especially for 
shorter trips, many people are no longer willing to pay. 
Some analysts have suggested that megacarriers such 
as American Airlines operate hybrids of banked and 
continuous/turnaround connections at their large hub 
cities (Jennings, 1993). They would work something like 
this: On dense, short-haul routes such as Dallas-San 
Antonio and Dallas-Houston, American would operate 
continuous, quick turnaround (Southwest Airlines-style) 
jet service to maximize aircraft use and overall efficiency. 
On less dense, long-haul routes into Dallas from 
medium-size cities such as Dayton, Hartford, and Reno, 
American would continue operating banked flights 
(aircraft use on long-haul services is by definition high). 
In theory, the Reno-San Antonio passenger could 
continue to receive adequate Dallas-connecting service 
even though Dallas-San Antonio planes would no longer 
be specifically banked to meet Reno-originating flights. 
This is because flight frequency in markets such as 
Dallas-San Antonio needs to be very high, anyway, due to 
local O&D demand. However, analysts at American 
Airlines and the other megacarriers have historically 
argued that simultaneously operating both banked and 
continuous/turnaround flights at hub cities may not work, 
even at the busiest of hubs; the mixing and matching, 
they say, would undermine the synergies associated with 
tightly timed feeds (Jennings, 1993). On the other hand, 
the analysts at Aviation Systems Research Corp. feel it is 
a viable way of lowering hub-related costs (ASRC, 1993). 
It is worth noting, however, that United Airlines' 
new (1994) low-cost Shuttle senice operates rapid 
turnaround flights, essentially Southwest Airlines-style 
continuous hubbing, in its West Coast service area. 
Regardless, events appear to be moving toward an 
untenable state because everyone is scrambling. New 
entrant airlines continue to appear on a regular basis, 
and while a few come and go, the majority are gradually 
expanding and eating away at megacarrier yields. The big 
airlines, as noted earlier, are not standing still. They are 
making major cuts in their management payrolls, 
accelerating the transfer of short-haul routes to their 
regional partners, and streamlining their fleets of aircraft; 
the question is, are they making the correct changes? If 
so, are they making the metamorphoses quickly enough? 
Of particular relevance here, however, are some 
controversial actions that may portend an all-out airline 
economics war. In the West, American Airlines 
transferred its San Jose hub to new jet entrant Reno Air 
in the recent past. Importantly, Reno's short-haul 
available seat miles (ASM) costs are dramatically lower 
than American's and are in fact only slightly higher than 
Southwest's ("Trends," 1995). American Airlines is able 
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to indirectly maintain a corporate presence on north- 
south Pacific coast routes through the coordination of 
scheduling, frequent-flier programs, and gate proximity 
with Reno Air. In the East, American is using the same 
formula with Midway Airlines, whose ASM costs are 35% 
lower than American's, at American's former Raleigh- 
Durham hub (Chandler, 1995). A similar program may 
follow at American Airlines' other weak (though still 
operational) hub, Nashville. 
The farming out of megacarrier markets is nothing 
new; the regionals have been inheriting these routes for 
decades. What is revolutionary is the transfer of relatively 
high-traffic markets, especially since the farmed out 
routes are being earmarked for low-cost, low-wage 
partner regionals and startups. This means that 
prestigious pilot jobs, and other positions as well, are 
being removed from large unionized airlines and handed 
to generally non-union partner airlines. Major carrier 
employees are not happy. However, American Airlines' 
management claims that to compete with the likes of 
Southwest, many short-haul routes must be moved to 
regionals and startup jet partner carriers. This is a 
debatable point, however, because the megacamers are 
grossly inefficient on even their medium hauls when 
compared with Southwest Airlines. Because American's 
salaries are on average no higher than Southwest's, and 
as American's flight crews say they are willing to operate 
turnaround-type senice similar to Southwest's, 
American's management has to take much of the 
responsibility for the company's dismal performance 
while Southwest was making handsome profits (ASRC, 
1993; Babbitt, 1994). Of course, some airline managers 
state that the extra expenses associated with hub-and- 
spoke systems more than pay for themselves through 
high-yield connecting and local O&D traffic. The upshot, 
though, is that these systems did not work successfully for 
the megacamers in recent years, especially for shorter 
flights operating to and through the hubs. 
The widespread, unprecedented abandonment of 
short-haul routes by the major airlines to adjust to the 
travel environment of the 1990s and to be competitive 
with low-cost airlines has taken many forms. As detailed 
above, American Airlines has already farmed out its 
medium-to-high density short-haul routes along both 
coasts to new jet airline companies with no corporate 
links to American Airlines or its parent corporation, 
AMR. At the American Airlines mega-hubs in Dallas and 
Chicago, American has accelerated its transfer of routes 
to its AMR-owned regional turboprop partners. For the 
first time, however, many of these Dallas or Chicago 
transferred markets (for example, Dallas-Wichita), are 
unquestionably jet-appropriate routes. American should 
probably not be engineering the downgrading of service 
to important medium-size cities. Although most of the 
economic reasons for this substitution were discussed 
earlier, one very important element, perhaps the most 
critical factor in these decisions, relates not to the 
economics of turboprops versus jets, but to the scope 
clause in American Airlines' contract with its jet pilots. 
A scope clause is written to ensure that the work 
unionized employees do is owned by the employees; in 
other words, scope clauses are written to prevent 
management from going out and finding non-company 
employees (who may be willing to perform the work for 
less compensation) to do the in-house work The scope 
clauses in airline pilot contracts specifically address what 
kind of work may be camed out by other companies, 
such as regional flights tolfrom small communities and, 
more importantly, what types of work cannot be farmed 
out. Among the megacamers, all are restricted by their 
pilots' contracts from shifting the operations of large 
aircraft (more than 70-90 passengers) to partner (code- 
sharing) regional airlines. Some contracts also restrict 
code-sharers from operating any and all pure jet 
equipment, even small 50-passenger regional jets (Flint, 
1995; Lewis, 1994). American Airlines circumvented the 
scope clause in its pilots' contract when it transferred its 
San Jose and Raleigh-Durham routes to wholly new 
airline companies. However, as neither Reno Air nor 
Midway Airlines has any corporate connection with 
American Airlines or AMR, the new airlines simply 
moved into their respective new hubs when American 
pulled out; the marketing and frequent-flier ties followed. 
Thus, the routes under scrutiny (San Jose-Seattle, 
Raleigh-Boston, and many others) were never, and could 
never be, because of American's contract with its pilots, 
formally transferred to the jet startups. Thus, American 
successfully dodged the scope clause in its pilots' contract 
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with an ingenious tactic. 
The other megacarrier airlines are using different 
strategies to deal with their short-haul economic and 
labor problems. United's Shuttle, as noted earlier, 
inaugurated Southwest Airlines-style Boeing 737 quick 
turnaround service on the West Coast in late 1994. While 
United's management proclaims that the new operation 
is financially successful, Southwest's chairman has stated 
that his carrier's costs are still far lower than the 
Shuttle's (Velocci, 1995). In any case, as nearly one-half 
of Shuttle by United's passengers are connecting 
travelers, the Shuttle and Southwest are not completely 
comparable. Of note is the fact that along with 
participating in the recent employee buyout of the 
airline, United pilots agreed to allow the new airline 
within an airline to operate Boeing jet equipment. There 
are, however, restrictions on how large the Shuttle can 
grow as compared to big United. That is because Shuttle 
by United pilots fly more hours and are paid less money 
than their counterparts at big United; they therefore 
represent a threat. 
Delta temtory, however, is where Battle 2000 may 
begin. As Delta Air Lines' scope clause in its pilots' 
contract does not restrict code-sharing partners from 
operating small jet aircraft, regional jets in Delta colors 
were literally crisscrossing America from north-to-south 
and east-to-west by mid-1995 (Flint, 1995). Operating out 
of Cincinnati and Salt Lake City, respectively, Delta 
Connection partners Comair and SkyWest are flying 
significant fleets of 50-passenger Canadair Regional Jets 
on long, thin routes such as Omaha-Cincinnati (Comair) 
and Eugene-Salt Lake City (SkyWest). In the Northeast, 
Delta Connection's Business Express is using three 70- 
passenger BAeIAVRO RJ70 jets to ferry passengers to 
Delta's New York (JFK) hub. Although these flights 
represent merely a small fraction of former Delta 
mainline routes, they are apparently a precursor to the 
acquisition of a sizable fleet of medium-size jets by the 
largest of Delta's code-sharing partners, Atlantic 
Southeast Airlines (MA) (Lewis, 1995). Is it the 
intention of ASA to merely add seat capacity to some of 
the very busy short hops into Atlanta from cities like 
Birmingham (134 miles) and Chattanooga (105 miles)? 
Or, is it ASA's (read: Delta's) intention to make an 
attempt to compete head-to-head with low-cost jet 
startups such as Valujet on routes such as Atlanta- 
Jacksonville (277 miles)? With ASA's very trim wage 
and overall operating structures (compared with partner 
Delta or any megacarrier airline), a jet-equipped ASA 
might be able to deliver a punishing or even fatal blow to 
all Atlanta-region new entrant competition, including the 
much vaunted Valujet. 
Of course, the pilots at Delta Air Lines are 
vehemently opposed to the transfer of any sizable Delta 
routes to a low-wage regional carrier planning to use 
medium-size jets to replace somewhat larger Delta jets. 
As far as Delta pilots are concerned, management would 
be violating the scope clause of its contract by such an 
action. Perhaps it is merely the intention of Delta 
management to intimidate its pilots (through actual 
andlor threatened large-scale jet operations at ASA, 
Business Express, Comair, and SkyWest) into agreeing to 
the wage and work-rule concessions necessary for starting 
an Atlanta-based Delta branded replica of Shuttle by 
United. 
From a wider perspective, Delta management's 
negotiations with its pilots may not bode well for new 
entrant jet airlines or the public at large; both would 
appear threatened by a corporate metamorphosis 
resulting in a much stronger Delta Air Lines. There are 
some analysts who say the days of scope clauses in airline 
employee contracts are numbered (Lewis, 1994). What 
can be said with absolute certainty, however, is that more 
and more moderately dense short- and medium-length 
routes are being farmed out to regional partner airlines 
that are lean operations paying relatively low wages; 
indeed, the pace of such route transfers is accelerating. It 
is also true that regional airlines are increasing their 
ownership of pure, although smaller, jet aircraft. 
Is it conceivable, therefore, that in the near future 
the megacarrier airlines will have so supplied their low- 
cost partners with routes and, indirectly, equipment, that 
the partners will be used as weapons to eliminate new 
startup competition? 
CONCLUSION 
It would be naive to make the assumption that the 
grandfather airlines are willingly sacrificing important 
short- and medium-haul, medium-density markets to the 
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new jet entrants. Still, it is not difficult to come to that 
conclusion given the tremendous strides new low-cost jet 
camers have made in the last half-decade amid a massive 
retreat by the grandfather airlines. The latters' required 
replacement service invariably translates to turboprop 
equipment: nice airplanes, but ill-suited in every 
competitive way to the task at hand. This insult to cities 
such as Fresno, Jackson, MidlandIOdessa, Portland (ME), 
Syracuse, Wichita, and scores of others is the bread and 
butter of jet startups coast to coast. 
Megacarrier management is not unaware of these 
facts and is likely quite cognizant of the ill will conveyed 
to some of its best customers when it pulls its jets from 
medium-size cities. Today's lost Fresno-Los Angeles 
customer is tomorrow's lost Fresno-Frankfurt passenger. 
To remain competitive, the megacamers must find 
some way of operating on a level playing field with the 
masses of low-cost jet entrants. Some say it i s  already a 
lost cause; it is simply too late for the retreating 
dinosaurs. However, there is considerable evidence 
indicating otherwise. It is becoming apparent that the 
grandfather airlines are advancing, although cautiously, by 
entering into partnerships with selected independent 
startups, such as Reno Air, creating low-cost subsidiaries 
in their own organizations (for example, Shuttle by 
United), and, perhaps most importantly, artfully 
negotiating with their pilots' unions to relax scope 
clauses prohibiting regional code-sharing partners from 
operating medium-size jet equipment. Once the co-opting 
of selected startup airlines and the renegotiating of scope 
clauses are complete, the megacarriers may well possess 
sufficient low-cost ammunition to destroy new entrant jet 
airlines at wi1l.o 
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